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Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP75B00285R000200020025-1

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The CIA Reassumption of the Overhead
Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuban
Targets

REFERENCE: A. USIB-D-41.14/305 dated 9 January 1967
Subject: Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance
of Cuba (Attachment I)

B. USIB-D-41.19/35 dated 31 January 1967, Page 11
Subject: Cuba-USIB Requirement (Attachment II)

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED.

C. [REDACTED] 25X1
Subject: Agreement between Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence on
National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations
(Attachment III)

NRO review(s) completed.

D. Excerpts from M/R dated 14 February 1964
Subject: Special Group (5411) Meeting at
1600 on 13 February (Attachment IV)

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the
Director of Central Intelligence; this action is contained in
paragraph 7.

2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest
more efficient utilization of the NRO's U-2 assets.

3. FACTS:

a. Project IDEALIST U-2 detachments at Edwards Air
Force Base has maintained the capability to perform covert
overhead reconnaissance missions whenever and wherever
required.

b. This detachment has been relatively inactive in
covert overhead reconnaissance for the U.S. Government
during the last two years.

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these assets be utilized to the best of their respective capabilities and within the respective basic character of each. (Attachment IV)

3. The assumption of the Cuban overhead reconnaissance missions by the Agency would permit vitally needed USAF crews and U-2 aircraft to be used in Southeast Asia and still permit the Agency to maintain its world-wide quick reaction covert U-2 reconnaissance capability.

2. Continued inactivity on the part of the Edwards IDEALIST detachment in the field of overhead reconnaissance will make it extremely difficult to justify the retention of the present U-2 as well as the forthcoming U-2R assets under Agency control.

4. BACKGROUND: The United States requirement for reconnaissance of Cuba originated in late 1960, and since that time the roles and functions of the various U.S. Government agencies performing this mission have undergone many changes. Originally, the requirement was satisfied by the Agency's IDEALIST U-2 detachment at Edwards Air Force Base, California. This organization flew its first reconnaissance sortie against Cuba on 27 October 1960, and continued in this role as the Cuban primary photographic intelligence collector until early October 1962 when the Russian/Cuban missile build-up was discovered on that island. As a result of this discovery, selected components of the U.S. Armed Forces went on a wartime alert status to be capable of taking whatever countering action that might be required. Photographic reconnaissance of Cuba then became an overt daily tactical requirement to provide up-to-date strike photography for U.S. military action if required. In view of this overt wartime alert situation the Cuban reconnaissance role was transferred from the Agency to the U.S. Air Force on 12 October 1962.

a. In addition to the transfer of the Cuban reconnaissance to the Air Force, the Agency had to loan the Air Force two of its U-2 aircraft (more modern than the Air Force's U-2's) so that they could have the best equipment available for their Cuban overflight missions.

b. Coincidental with the Cuban missile crisis, the Chinese Communists began to make excursions into Indian territory along their adjoining border. The IDEALIST Edwards detachment was alerted for possible photographic coverage of that area in October 1962, was deployed [redacted] in November, and flew its first covert overhead photographic mission of the Sino-Indian Border in early December 1962. *not first*

c. Essentially the same parallel changes of reconnaissance roles occurred in Southeast Asia. Project IDEALIST performed the initial covert overflight reconnaissance of that area until overt military actions were begun. The SAC U-2 Wing was then assigned the overt reconnaissance task of photographing the military's targets. The Agency once again assisted the Air Force in this area by the loan of two of its U-2's when the hostile threat became too much for the less sophisticated Air Force U-2's.

5. DISCUSSION:

a. Since the end of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the requirement for photographic coverage of Cuba has been reduced by USIB and COMOR (underlined portions of Attachment I and II) from the pure tactical role to virtually the same strategic role that was performed by the Agency prior to the crisis. When the Agency reassumes the Cuban overhead photographic reconnaissance task, the Air Force would redirect their U-2 assets, now held back for the Cuban overflights, toward their Vietnam reconnaissance requirements.

b. The return of the Cuban reconnaissance mission to the Agency will not, as far as Cuba is concerned, upset the status quo. The U.S. Government's position on Cuban reconnaissance as stated in Attachment I is that of "demonstrating the principle as well as the fact of a U.S. reconnaissance presence over the Island." Use of an Agency U-2 over Cuba maintains this position. Additionally, were the U.S./Cuba situation to improve, it would be politically more practicable to explain an Agency U-2 over Cuba rather than a military reconnaissance aircraft.

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6. CONCLUSIONS: In view of the fact that both the Air Force and the Agency's U-2's are assets of the National Reconnaissance Program, it would be sound management practice (underlined portion of Attachment III) and in the national interest to have both of these reconnaissance organizations used to the best of their respective capabilities, i.e., the SAC U-2's in support of the overt military efforts in Vietnam, and the Agency's U-2's in support of the covert and strategic reconnaissance of Cuban targets. In addition to the Cuban targets the Agency's U-2's would continue to be responsive to any other contingency requiring covert overhead photographic reconnaissance in the Western Hemisphere (Central or South America) as well as any place else in the world.

7. RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend the DCI approach Mr. McNamara and/or the 303 Committee on this subject and solicit their concurrence on CIA's reassumption of the overhead photographic reconnaissance of Cuban targets.

CARL E. DUCKETT
Acting Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachments - 4
As stated

USIB-D-41.14/305
(COMOR-D-24/203)
10 January 1967
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.14/205 (COMOR-D-24/178),
27 November 1964

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1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, (COMOR), on the subject is submitted for USIB consideration of the recommendations in paragraph 4. of [redacted] memorandum.

USIB Action Requested:

2. Board Members are requested to advise the Secretariat not later than 1200, 13 January 1967, of their concurrence in or other views on the COMOR recommendations in para. 4. of the attached.

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[redacted]
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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Attachment

USIB-D-41.14/305

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(COMOR-D-24/178)

9 January 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.14/205 (COMOR-D-24/178),
27 November 1964

1. The United States requirement for GLASS LAMP reconnaissance of Cuba is still strongly influenced by our experience relating to the missile crisis of 1962. During that crisis and immediately thereafter, we maintained a very high level of surveillance of Cuba to insure that offensive weapons had been withdrawn and to maximize assurance that they would not be reintroduced. Measures were also taken by the intelligence community to increase probabilities of a tipoff concerning reintroduction of offensive weapons by an increased COMINT effort, increased surveillance of Soviet shipping, and other means.

2. In view of the burden caused by the high level of reconnaissance and in view of the increasing assurance that there was a good chance that we might get an early indication of Soviet intent to reintroduce offensive weapons through some other intelligence collection medium, the USIB on 25 November 1964 (see reference) reduced the requirement for GLASS LAMP coverage to call for the acquisition of photography of approximately 90 per cent of Cuban land mass each 28 days. The requirement further provided that the missions flown to acquire this coverage should be spread out during the coverage period to provide a form of time-sampling, as well as area coverage. Fulfillment of this requirement has been influenced by weather and other operational problems. There has been substantial coverage during all of the 28-day periods, but during three periods net coverage dropped well below the indicated requirement. No major intelligence problems arose however as a result of these shortfalls.

3. It is concluded that:

a. There is need for continued GLASS LAMP surveillance of Cuba in support of valid U.S. intelligence needs for accurate and timely information on the possible

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9 January 1967

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successful reintroduction of strategic offensive weapons on the island. Periodic coverage is also required in support of clandestine operations and to detect any development of an enemy capability to attack in the Guantanamo area and to provide an accurate means for assessing the changing nature of conventional military forces on the island.

b. The importance of continued GLASS LAMP surveillance of Cuba is stressed as a means of demonstrating the principle, as well as the fact, of a U.S. reconnaissance "presence" over the island. Termination of such reconnaissance would imply a major shift in U.S. national policy with regard to Cuba and would make extremely difficult the reinstatement of aircraft surveillance in the future.

c. It appears that current USIB requirements for photographic coverage of Cuba (see reference) are more stringent than the situation requires. This conclusion stems primarily from interpretation of National Intelligence Estimates relating to the probability of reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Other factors such as the redundancy of photographic coverage of the present effort have been carefully weighed and examined.

4. It is recommended that the Board approve the following program for overhead photographic reconnaissance of Cuba:

a. Coverage of approximately 90 per cent of the territory of Cuba every 56 days with the stipulation that missions be scheduled to permit periodic sampling in each of the COMOR target categories every two weeks, with reasonably complete coverage of all targets every 56 days.

b. A quick-reaction capability, reported by DIA as an objective of the JCS, be maintained for high- and low-level photographic coverage of Cuba to confirm information from any source that suggests developments inimical to the United States are taking place.

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Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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USIB-D-41.19/37

(COMOR-D-72/37)

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Attachment II

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CUBA

USIB Requirement

1. There are 177 targets in Cuba programmed for coverage by overhead photography.
2. On 25 November 1964^a the Board approved the requirement for overhead photography of Cuba to coverage of about 90 per cent of the territory with interpretable photography at least once every four weeks specifying that missions be flown on a random basis. On 13 January 1967 the Board approved modification of the requirement. Coverage of about 90 per cent of the territory is now stretched to 56 days. Missions are to be scheduled to permit periodic sampling in each target category every two weeks, with reasonably complete coverage of all targets every 56 days.
3. In addition to U-2 coverage, Cuba is programmed as Priority 3 for J coverage.

Authority for Reconnaissance

4. On 30 December 1966 the 303 Committee approved six to eight U-2 (GLASS LAMP) sorties for January 1967.

^aUSIB-D-41.14/205 (COMOR-D-24/178), 27 November 1964
^bUSIB-D-41.14/305 (COMOR-D-24/203), 10 January 1967

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2 May 1962

Attachment III

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Agreement Between

Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence

on

National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations

Definitions:

NRPG -National Reconnaissance Planning Group

NRP -National Reconnaissance Program, to consist of all overt and covert satellite and overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic signal collection.

NRO -National Reconnaissance Office

DNRO -Director, National Reconnaissance Office

Responsibilities:

The National Reconnaissance Planning Group (NRPG), consisting of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, is responsible for providing policy and program guidance and managerial direction for the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and for making final determinations in connection therewith which do not require the exercise of higher authority. The Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent, is responsible for implementing plans and policies developed by the NRPG, and for that purpose has established a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to manage and conduct the NRP in such manner as to insure the most effective utilization of the particular talents, experience, and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, designates the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO), who is responsible for the operation of that office in accordance with the following terms and conditions:

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Requirements and Priorities:

The NRO will be directly responsive to, and only the photographic and electronic signal (SIGINT) collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board and will develop the over-all reconnaissance program to satisfy these requirements.

2. Management:

a. The technical management responsibility for the NRP is assigned to the DNRO. Under this over-all responsibility for NRP, DNRO will utilize existing resources in the following manner:

(1) CIA will be the Executive Agent for DNRO those covert projects already under its management and such additional covert projects as are assigned to it by the NRPG.

(2) To provide for full use of available capabilities and resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the NRP personnel of Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA, will be assigned on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within the NRO under the DNRO.

(3) A firm liaison channel between the NRO and the NSA will be established as an adjunct to the technical management structure of signal collection projects, and the conduct of such projects carried out in accordance with the exploitation responsibilities of the NSA.

(4) Planning will encompass maximum utilization of the technical and operational resources of the DOD, the Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, and the CIA to support all collection programs, including, but not limited to, electronic signal and photographic collection programs.

b. Financial Management:

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(1) The DNRO will be responsible for review and approval of the total NRP budget.

For those covert projects for which it has management responsibility under paragraph 2.a.(1) above, CIA normally include funds in its regular appropriations. If funds are required in addition to such appropriations, NRPG, with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, may authorize transfers of appropriate amounts from DOD to CIA. In the event it is

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initial funding may be by transfer of such funds from DOD to CIA as NRPG with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget may direct, subsequent funding to be obtained by CIA through normal appropriation channels. On those projects where CIA acts as procurement agent for NRO, the funds will be advanced or reimbursed by DOD to CIA in accordance with the principles of the Economy Act.

(2) DNRO will have responsibility for all NRP contracts in accordance with the assignment of technical management responsibility in paragraph 2.a. Consistent with paragraph 2.a.(1), CIA will be the Executive Agent of the DNRO, responsible for administering procurement and contracting for covert projects for which it is assigned responsibility under paragraph 2.a.(1), and for covert contracting necessary for the support of overt projects.

3. Security:

In accordance with the basic responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA will establish security policy for the NRP, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility.

4. Operations:

a. Scheduling: The mission schedule for all NRP efforts will be the sole responsibility of DNRO, subject to coordination with CIA on covert projects for which it is Executive Agent and the obtaining of appropriate clearances where required from higher authority. Operational control for individual projects under the NRP will be assigned to the DOD or to the CIA by the DNRO in accordance with policy guidance from the NRPG. DNRO will be responsible to assure that mission planning will make full use of all intelligence available in the community.

b. Format: The DNRO will be responsible for the format of the collected NRP product as follows:

(1) Photographic format will include the initial chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the users as specified by the USIB.

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(2) Electronic signal data format will include the decommutation, conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the collected signal data to yield a usable collection product. DNRO will deliver the collection product in proper format together with associated data necessary for exploitation, to the NSA or other user as specified by the USIB.

c. Engineering Analysis: The DNRO will be responsible for engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide information for new systems. In connection with covert projects for which CIA is Executive Agent, this responsibility will be carried out under the supervision of CIA.

5. The DNRO is responsible for advanced plans (post CY-1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsibility to the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRO advanced planning will be coordinated with CIA.

6. Public releases of information will be the responsibility of the DNRO subject to the security guidance of CIA.

7. The Deputy Director (Research), CIA, will be responsible for seeing that the participation of CIA in this Agreement is carried out.

(Signed)

John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

(Signed)

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Excerpts from M/R dtd 14 February 1964, subject: Special Group
(5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

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to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,
most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

13/115C

Marshall G. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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1 - Elder [redacted]
1 - DDCI
Paras 1 - 5 to [redacted]
Paras 6 & 7 to DD/S&I

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